Structuring Relief for Sex Offenders from Registration and Notification Requirements: Learning from Foreign Jurisdictions and from the \u3cem\u3eModel Penal Code: Sentencing\u3c/em\u3e by Demleitner, Nora V.
Washington and Lee University School of Law 
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons 
Scholarly Articles Faculty Scholarship 
2018 
Structuring Relief for Sex Offenders from Registration and 
Notification Requirements: Learning from Foreign Jurisdictions 
and from the Model Penal Code: Sentencing 
Nora V. Demleitner 
Washington and Lee University School of Law, demleitnern@wlu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlufac 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal 
Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nora V. Demleitner, Structuring Relief for Sex Offenders from Registration and Notification Requirements: 
Learning from Foreign Jurisdictions and from the Model Penal Code: Sentencing, 30 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 317 
(2018). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Washington & Lee University 
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles by an authorized 
administrator of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please 
contact christensena@wlu.edu. 
Structuring Relief for Sex Offenders from Registration and
Notification Requirements: Learning from Foreign
Jurisdictions and from the Model Penal Code: Sentencing
I. Introduction
Despite recent court rulings that have limited some of the
collateral sanctions imposed specifically on those labeled
sex offenders,1 their sui generis treatment within the crimi-
nal justice system continues. For them post-sentence col-
lateral sanctions abound. Among these sanctions are
residence limitations, exclusions from select locations,
restrictions on Internet and social media usage, public
housing bars, employment restrictions, and registration
and public notification.2 These collateral sanctions are
usually mandatory, which means they flow automatically
from the conviction. Courts have generally declared them to
be civil rather than criminal sanctions, which removes
proportionality concerns and allows for their retroactive
imposition.3 Despite their nominally preventive function,
offenders and the public alike consider and experience
these sanctions as stigmatizing and punitive. This is par-
ticularly true for the sex offender registry with its attendant
public notification component.
Many of the post-sentence restrictions on sex offenders,
including registration and notification, have been based on
false assumptions about the ongoing dangerousness of sex
offenders.4 In fact, sex offenders have a lower overall
recidivism rate than offenders generally. More importantly,
sex offenders generally are very unlikely to commit another
sex crime, though statistical probability varies by type of sex
offense conviction.5
Myths and incorrect suppositions about sexual
offenders pervade discourse and inform policy making.
As crime generally has declined, so have sex crimes
despite national headlines that imply the opposite.6
Because of high-profile media reports of violent sex
crimes and well-known low reporting rates of sexual
offenses generally, the decline in sexual offending has
been downplayed or treated with disbelief. Punitive and
incapacitative responses continue to dominate as sex
offenders are deemed incorrigible. Yet sex offender
treatment is much more effective than assumed, albeit
being time intensive and expensive.7
Accurate empirical information should provide the
backdrop to the sentencing of sex offenders, including the
imposition of narrowly tailored collateral sanctions and
their termination. That would allow for the effective
re-integration of sex offenders, rather than their internal
banishment, and enhance public safety.
This paper first discusses the scope of sex offender
registration and notification under federal and state laws,
and contrasts U.S. laws with those in other countries. Part
III turns to the prevailing rationales for these laws and tests
their empirical validity. It highlights the negative effect of
registries and notification on criminal investigations, and
the cost they impose on public coffers, public safety, and
those labeled sex offenders. Part IV discusses a set of
proposals to turn registries, which may serve a limited
legitimate function, into more effective law enforcement
tools while restricting public notification. This section
outlines ex ante limitations on such laws, and then turns to
mechanisms that would allow individual offenders to
petition for their termination. This discussion provides
the context for an analysis of the relief provisions set out in
the American Law Institute (ALI) Model Penal Code
(MPC): Sentencing, Article 7.8 The article concludes that
to enhance public safety and reintegrate sex offenders, the
United States would be better served by moving away from
public notification, limiting registries, and investing more
heavily in prevention and the treatment of convicted sex
offenders.
II. Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Since the 1930s sex offenders have been singled out for
special treatment. California was the first to adopt a sex
offender registry in 1947, but only a handful of states fol-
lowed suit in the decades following. In the wake of some
high-profile sexually motivated killings of children, between
1994 and 1997 thirty-eight states required sex offenders to
register. By the turn of the century almost all states also
mandated public notification.9 The impetus for these laws
was the assumption that all sex offenders were highly likely
to re-offend, that law enforcement should be able to inves-
tigate them more easily, and that the public should be in
a position to protect itself from sexual offenders.10 Some
foreign countries have also set up sex offender registries, in
some cases following the U.S. model. Yet, so far almost
none have adopted U.S.-style public notification.11 The
registries used abroad are largely law enforcement tools.
The absence of public notification may reflect the greater
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confidence the citizens of many other Western democracies
place in the ability of their police to protect them.
Since the mid-1990s federal legislation has driven many
of the legislative changes in the states. The Jacob Wetterling
Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Act, enacted as a part of the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, required all
states to register sex offenders. Megan’s Law in 1996
allowed public disclosure of information in sex offender
registries and mandated public disclosure if needed to
protect the public. The same year, the Pam Lynchner Sexual
Offender Tracking and Identification Act created the
National Sex Offender Registry (NSOR), a national database
for law enforcement officials. In the following years, further
legislation tightened these rules and responded to the
expansion of public Internet access.
The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of
2006 brought substantial change to federal standards for
sex offender registration and notification.12 As a result, all
U.S. states, the District of Columbia, most federally recog-
nized tribes, and U.S. territories have sex offender regis-
tries and require public notification, which extend to sex
offense convictions under state, federal, territorial, tribal,
and foreign laws, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
The Department of Justice created the Office of Sex
Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Regis-
tering, and Tracking (SMART) to administer the standards
set out for registration and notification.
Further legislation followed, albeit of lesser systemic
impact. The 2016 International Megan’s Law requires
registered sex offenders to provide a twenty-one-day
advance notice of international travel, information that will
be transmitted to the intended destination countries.13
Section I of the Adam Walsh Act, The Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), delineates the
specific elements states have to implement in exchange for
(limited) federal funding through Byrne law enforcement
assistance grants, and sets up a national portal to house
state sex offender websites.14 It increases the categories of
offenders who have to register, extends registration periods,
demands greater verification of the information provided,
and details penalty requirements for failure to register.
SORNA requires offenders to be classified according to an
offense-of-conviction-based three-tier system, with each tier
carrying specific registration and notification requirements
that include the length of registration, frequency of re-
registration, and the type of public notification required.15
Tier I offenders are subject to an irreducible ten-year reg-
istration period, Tier II offenders to twenty-five years, and
Tier III offenders to life.
As of December 2017, the SMART office has found
merely twenty-one of the fifty-six jurisdictions in compli-
ance, with only eighteen of the fifty states meeting mini-
mum SORNA requirements.16 A number of states have
intentionally rejected the SORNA requirements because
the federal financial support provided is insufficient to
cover the cost of setting up and keeping current the
required databases, especially in light of the amount and
type of information to be compiled. Other states deem
a classification system based on the offense of conviction
misleading as it fails to categorize offenders based on the
danger they represent, but instead stigmatizes offenders
whose offenses should not trigger public notification.
Consequently, the length of registration for the same
offense differs among states, as do the types of crimes
subject to registration and notification. Those differences
lead to substantial variations among states, resulting in
a national patchwork. Even though the opportunities sex
offenders have for relief from registration and notification
requirements are most limited, there is again great vari-
ability among states in the opportunities available, process,
and qualification requirements.17
For offenders the lack of uniformity proves disorienting.
An offender’s state of residence and state of work, for
example, may have different requirements, seeing the
person registered and the public notified in one state but
not the other. Also, offenders who move from a less
restrictive to a more restrictive state may find the registra-
tion and notification statute suddenly covering them
(again). Some of them would consider that requirement
sufficiently onerous to refrain from moving to the more
restrictive state. Easily accessible and accurate information
about such a collateral consequence is therefore crucial to
individuals who have a criminal record. That need supports
the ALI MPC: Sentencing’s demand that a Sentencing
Commission, or similar state entity, serve as a repository of
all possible collateral consequences.18
The foreign countries that require sex offenders to reg-
ister also vary in their coverage of offenses and lengths of
registration period. In contrast to the usually categorically
mandated time periods in the United States, some foreign
countries allow a convicted offender to petition for a short-
ening of the registration period. Canada’s registration per-
iods depend on the maximum length of imprisonment for
the crime of conviction but can be terminated at half time,
or at twenty years for lifetime registration, if the court finds
the impact of continued registration to be grossly dispro-
portionate to public protection because it hampers the
effective investigation of sex crimes.19
In the United States support for sex offender registries
is widespread, though their scope is disputed. The notifi-
cation component, on the other hand, has been subject to
more debate, and empirical data appear to indicate that if
not downright harmful, it does not serve the public well and
has proven onerous to offenders subject to notification.
III. The Effectiveness and Value of Registries
and Public Notification
Registration and notification statutes were adopted to serve
a variety of purposes but most importantly public safety.
Public safety may be achieved in different ways. Registries
may support general deterrence purposes or instead deter
convicted offenders from committing another sex crime.
They also allow law enforcement agencies to interrogate
318 FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER • VOL . 30 , NOS . 4 -5 • APR I L/JUNE 2018
convicted sex offenders quickly once a sex crime occurs,
either to rule them out as suspects or to investigate them
further.
Notification statutes add a preventive function as the
public will be able to identify those convicted of a sex crime
and therefore protect themselves more effectively, by
keeping their distance or alerting law enforcement to
potential criminal activity in its early stages. Like the cur-
rent discourse surrounding legal gun ownership, registries
are portrayed as both deterrent and defensive. The public is
empowered to intervene should the state fail in its protec-
tive function. In the United States it has been difficult to
test these different hypotheses empirically because of the
overlap between registration and notification, subjecting
most sex offenders to both. Yet the public and offenders
appear to agree that whether the purpose of these statutes is
being served or not, they shame and stigmatize sex
offenders.
A. Risk and Recidivism
The primary purposes of registration and notification are to
control risk and prevent recidivism. Some early, but lim-
ited, data showed that sex offenses generally decreased with
the advent of registration statutes, largely by preventing the
first sex offense.20 That finding supported the general
deterrent hypothesis, though it raises concretely one of the
perennial questions in sentencing, whether it is legitimate
to use a convicted offender to advance general, rather than
specific, deterrence. A few studies indicate that registration
statutes may deter sex offenders from recidivating. Those
findings, however, are limited to a small number of states
and may conflate general recidivism data with findings
specific to sex offenses. If sex offender registries and noti-
fication prevent recidivism generally, does that counsel that
broader groups of offenders be subjected to such require-
ments? Yet other studies indicate no impact on recidivism,
especially for low-risk offenders, and some even note
a negative effect.21 At best the studies are contradictory.
Research on registries is surprisingly limited and often
employs aggregate data on sex offenders even though
studies indicate that specific types of sex crimes have sub-
stantially higher recidivism risks. At present registries fail
to provide the public with an accurate assessment of the
danger an offender presents, and use law enforcement
resources ineffectively. In addition, personal factors, such
as age, impact how likely it is for an offender to commit
another sex crime. As is true for all crimes, the likelihood of
recidivating decreases with the length of time since the
conviction and release from a sentence. Most researchers
have concluded that the offense of conviction alone, there-
fore, presents a misleading picture of the risk an individual
presents.22
The tier classifications under the Adam Walsh Act fail to
consider any of these additional factors and group crimes
without regard to the empirically indicated risk an offender
presents. Instead of an inflexible and insufficiently scien-
tifically validated tier system, researchers have suggested
the use of actuarial risk assessments to determine which
offenders should be subjected to registration and notifica-
tion.23 Such assessments would have the side benefit of
allowing low-level offenders who are unlikely to commit
another sex crime to re-integrate more effectively into
society.
Research also indicates that the current length of reg-
istration periods is excessive. With most recidivism occur-
ring within five years of release, registration and
notification periods should generally end five to ten years
after release, rather than extending for decades.24 Even
though some states have heeded such recommendations,
which put them at odds with the SORNA requirements,
many continue to employ broad and offense-based regis-
tration and notification that negatively impact public safety
and the individual offender.
Because of the general fear of sex offender recidivism,
failure to register is considered a grave criminal offense. It
is usually deemed a serious risk factor for further offend-
ing. Research indicates, however, that even though failure
to register is correlated with recidivism generally, it is not
linked to committing future sexual offenses.25 Failure to
register or to keep the registration current appears also
often connected to the shaming and stigma the offender
experiences in the community. In contrast to the United
States, Canada has a high compliance rate with its sex
offender registry, likely because of the absence of a notifi-
cation component. Many Canadian sex offenders under-
stand and often agree with the purpose of registration but
have indicated serious concern about public notification.26
Registration and notification requirements also impact plea
bargaining and sentencing.
B. Impact on Plea Bargaining and Sentencing
Registration and especially notification requirements have
impacted plea bargaining and sentencing. Although many
collateral consequences remain relatively unknown, sex
offender registration and notification statutes are highly
publicized and part of public consciousness. To avoid the
sex offender label, with its resulting collateral sanctions,
those charged therefore attempt to plead to non-sexual
offenses.27 If such avoidance of a sex crime label is suc-
cessful, and if it were true that registries and notification
discourage offender recidivism,28 collateral sanctions may
ultimately undermine rather than support public safety
efforts. If an offender is convicted of a sex crime, some
judges factor the impact of sex offender registration and
notification statutes into the sentence, as an aspect of the
overall punishment imposed;29 others do not. That dis-
parity may lead to substantial sentence inequities.
Because of the substantial impact of this collateral
sanction, which is similar in many respects to deporta-
tion—one resulting in internal banishment, the other in
exile30—defense lawyers and perhaps the court should be
obligated to inform the defendant accordingly. So far courts
have rejected that suggestion, however, as not constitu-
tionally mandated.31 Yet, the offender should have the
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opportunity to factor registration and notification require-
ments into the decision whether to accept a plea or proceed
to trial. The ALI MPC: Sentencing requires the sentencing
commission to publish all collateral sanctions as applicable
to specific offenses, § 7.02, and requires the court to notify
the defendant at sentencing of all applicable collateral
consequences under state and federal law, § 7.04, the pos-
sibility that they may change over time, and that they may
differ in other jurisdictions.32 The defendant should also be
informed of his right to petition for relief from a mandatory
collateral sanction when the sentence expires. In addition, if
the defendant is found guilty of a registrable offense, it
would be helpful if he were informed at sentencing and in
writing of the ramifications of non-compliance, as they are
substantial.
Monitoring sex offenders and assuring the accuracy of
registry information has proven difficult, time intensive,
and expensive.
C. Using Information on Sex Offenders
Broad sex offender registries are costly for law enforcement
and probation offices because of the need for enhanced
supervision and ongoing (re-)registration, which requires
review of the accuracy of the information supplied. Law
enforcement is also asked to expend resources on low-level
offenders who are unlikely to present a risk of committing
further sex offenses. In fact, the Los Angeles District
Attorney and a number of other law enforcement officials
in California lobbied for low-level sex offenders to be per-
mitted to petition for removal from the registry after ten to
twenty years, depending on the offense. Re-registration
requirements and the sheer size of the California registry
have hampered law enforcement efforts to focus on the
most high-risk sex offenders. Starting in 2021, depending
on the tier in which they find themselves, those with
a criminal record for a sex crime will be able to petition
a judge for removal, assuming they have not reoffended for
a decade or two upon release. A much smaller group of
offenders will continue to be subject to lifetime registration.
Even though the public strongly approves of sex
offender notification statutes and is aware of the existence
and easy availability of the information on the Internet, little
is known how they use it. Anecdotal evidence points to
users learning faces of offenders in case they spot them at
schools or playgrounds. Large-scale data, however, show the
public accessing registries only to a limited extent. More
effective safety measures than scanning registries include
getting to know the individuals well with whom a child
spends unsupervised time, as most sex offenders are not
strangers but teachers, coaches, family friends, or relatives
who do not have a prior criminal record.33
A few Canadian provinces with their own sex offender
registries allow for public notification in exceptional cir-
cumstances only. A community will receive information
once a highly dangerous sex offender moves there.
Although that exposes the offender to an unusual level of
publicity, if narrowly targeted, such notification may have
a preventive effect. Because of the sheer scale of registries,
the U.S. public, however, lacks the tools to focus on the
most dangerous sex offenders.34 Perhaps it understands
that notification serves a goal other than public safety.
D. A Collateral Sanction or a Penalty?
Offenders—and the public—perceive notification, but not
registration, requirements as punitive and designed to
shame the offender. This perception runs counter to the
legal classification of registration and notification as non-
punitive civil measures,35 and appears to be based on
a media portrayal of sex offenders as not amenable to
change.36
The negative impact of notification on registered sex
offenders has been widely documented. Public notification
has triggered incidents of vigilantism and discrimination
against them. In addition to formal limitations on (public)
housing and employment,37 sex offenders find themselves
often subjected to social prejudice, which leads to exclu-
sion. Some sex offenders have been unable to rent, leaving
them homeless. Many have difficulties finding any
employment. The impact has been particularly jarring for
individuals whose offenses had long been in the past and
for those who had either not been required to register or
had come off registries in their home state but then were
required to register (again) when moving. In some cases the
stress and other socially exclusionary consequences trig-
gered by public notification statutes may have hampered re-
integration efforts and contributed to repeat offending.38
These results have caused researchers to call for limiting
public notification to the most dangerous sex offenders
only,39 perhaps akin to the Canadian provincial model,
which allows for public notification of the most dangerous
sex offenders. On the other hand, offenders understand the
purpose of registration statutes, as assisting police in the
investigation of sex crimes and to find the culprit more
quickly, which includes ruling out a previously convicted
sex offender early in a criminal probe.
Despite the extensive cost and drawbacks of registries
and notification, legislators generally remain unwilling to
roll them back. In light of the prevailing reluctance to
reconsider the treatment of sex offenders, individual relief
may be the only possible avenue.
IV. MPC: Sentencing Article 7 and Beyond: Individual
Relief
The sentencing court should impose registration require-
ments, based on individualized risk assessment, informed
by solid research, and limited in length. Group-based
judgments are overbroad. The category of sex offenders
includes a vastly disparate set of offenders, who pose dif-
ferent threats to the public. Risk-based collateral sanctions
would mirror evidence-based sentencing, described in
§ 6B.09 of the MPC: Sentencing, which outlines the devel-
opment of actuarial instruments to assess an offender’s risk
to public safety.
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Courts that already employ risk assessments when
deciding what sentence to impose could extend their
application to statutory sex offender notification and regis-
tration requirements. Indeed, the law in some states already
provides for this.40 Despite a robust literature critiquing
risk-based sentencing, such individualized assessment
would still be preferable over the broad registration and
notification requirements currently employed. The use of
such assessment tools appears more defensible for collat-
eral sanctions than perhaps at sentencing where they are
beginning to be used.41 The management of sex offenders
should ultimately correspond to the individual risk they
pose.42
A. Risk-Based Registration and Notification
Thoughtful registration would most likely present a useful
law-enforcement tool. As long as the types of offenders on
the registry are the most serious, and the terms of regis-
tration are limited and tied to years of crime-free life, law
enforcement would be expected to monitor only those
offenders who pose the greatest risk. Among the group of
offenders who should never be subject to registration or re-
registration are those who commit non-sex crimes even if
they have a prior sex crime on their criminal record, those
who commit misdemeanor offenses, and those sentenced
to probation.
The Illinois Sex Offense and Sex Offender Registration
Task Force, for example, suggested that generally sex
offenders would be subject to a ten-year desistance
threshold, after which they should come off the registry.43
Such a requirement may be individualized or more care-
fully calibrated by offense group. Lower-level offenders may
be removed even earlier, which would permit law enforce-
ment to focus their limited resources on higher-level
offenders. Shorter registration periods could be combined
with a prosecutorial prerogative to file for an extension of
the registration period under certain circumstances. Nar-
rowly focused registries would allocate resources smartly
and target services and supervision on high-risk offenders
to reduce recidivism.
Notification, which is an outlier internationally, should
be categorically restricted to the most dangerous offenders.
That means public notification should be a very rare
occurrence. Alternatively, public notification may never be
permitted but instead a select group of employers—
healthcare facilities, nursing homes, daycare providers, and
similar types of employers, depending on the type of sex
crime committed—and school officials, together with law
enforcement only, may receive such notifications. Alterna-
tively, states could create systems that would allow these
select employers, before making a hiring decision, to query
sex offender databases that list the most high-risk offenders
or to submit their inquiries to a specific law-enforcement
resource officer.
Even though the proposed measures would substantially
enhance public safety, they are unlikely to be adopted. For
that reason, individuals should have at their disposal
mechanisms to remove collateral sanctions. Such a pro-
posal may be more politically acceptable in an environment
that continues to vilify sex offenders.
B. Individual Relief
A number of states have moved away from purely offense-
based registration and notification to focus on a host of
offense- and offender-based characteristics that align with
the likely risk an offender poses.44 Generally such
approaches lead to a more limited number of offenders on
state webpages. Yet, even the best predictive tools will
occasionally under- and overpredict. Registrants should be
provided a petition-based judicial or administrative mech-
anism for removal, available once an individual meets cer-
tain markers. Sex offender registration and notification
statutes, as currently implemented, run counter to the
stated goal of the MPC: Sentencing which is to make ‘‘col-
lateral consequences consistent with overriding goals of
public safety and recidivism prevention.’’45 The application
of that standard to registration and notification may lessen
the stigma imposed on individuals convicted of a sex
offense and improve public safety. Yet, it remains
insufficient.
1. Terminating Collateral Consequences. It is unclear
how the MPC: Sentencing interprets the baseline goals ref-
erenced above. Empirical research indicates that the vast
majority of notification statutes and overly broad registra-
tion requirements do not improve public safety. Since they
do not add a public safety benefit but rather impede suc-
cessful reintegration, by definition they should be
rescinded. The legislation cited in the Comment to this
provision, however, implies a narrower interpretation. The
Alabama Code allows courts, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, to relieve sex offenders with terminal illness of res-
idency restrictions if they are not likely to reoffend or
perpetrate any future dangerous sexual offense.46 That
statute assumes, a priori, that a residency restriction serves
a public safety purpose. That notion remains, however,
disputed. The example appears to imply that courts would,
or should, accept existing collateral sanctions.
The MPC: Sentencing provides that the state sentencing
commission should provide guidance on relief from col-
lateral sanctions, though that could also be included in
legislation, should a state not have a commission or com-
parable institution. The section’s guidance includes sug-
gestions that the court consider individual circumstances
that impact public safety, including treatment and evidence
of rehabilitation.47 Courts may be assisted by evidence-
based assessments, to prevent them from overvaluing the
risk someone with a sex crime conviction may constitute
going forward. Such risk assessments should account for
treatment and evidence of rehabilitation, though the court
may still consider both independently.
Whether courts would be willing to terminate collateral
consequences for individual sex offenders, either at sen-
tencing or at a later point, remains open to question.
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Although some federal courts consider long prison terms
for the downloading of child pornography draconian, it is
uncertain whether courts more broadly would be willing to
terminate sex offender registration and notification even
under this provision. After all, the evidence the petitioner
presents can never entirely preclude the commission of
another offense. Alternatively, the provision may permit
a global challenge at least to notification for lower-level sex
offenders, especially if courts deem commission of a low-
level sex offense a limited risk.
Section 7.04 details that the sentencing judge grant
relief only if the defendant has demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence three separate components: the col-
lateral sanction (a) is not substantially related to elements
and facts of the offense, (b) is likely to impose a substantial
burden on the individual’s reintegration, and (c) public
safety considerations do not require mandatory imposi-
tion.48 Whether general information would suffice for (b)
and (c), or the individual would have to show a substantial
and specific individual disadvantage and public safety con-
siderations is unclear. Finally, the first provision may either
lead to retention of the current statutory regime or instead
allow a broad challenge of registration and notification, at
least for low-level offenders. The third possibility is that
courts will separate registration from notification, as the
two are not necessarily connected. This provision may
present a great opportunity at least for some sex offenders,
though it remains unclear how courts may interpret it even
in light of the guidance presented.
Similarly, § 7.05, applicable to relief for convictions from
other jurisdictions, requires that the offender show, by clear
and convincing evidence, not only a specific need for such
relief but also ‘‘that public-safety considerations do not
require mandatory imposition of the consequence.’’49 For
certain low-level offenses—some of which should never
carry registration or notification consequences—the
offender may not have any difficulty making such a show-
ing. Examples may include public urination or underage
consensual sex with someone barely younger than the
offender. In other cases, it remains uncertain what types of
evidence an offender needs to put forth to defeat public
safety considerations. Would a showing of no further con-
victions after a certain period of time suffice? Would the
offender have to indicate that he underwent treatment?
Would the absence of sex offense convictions alone allow
for removal from a registry? Or might general statistical
information on sex offender recidivism also be required?
Would they have to specify the type of sex offense under-
lying the conviction, or might the data have to be jurisdic-
tion specific?
2. Certificates of Restoration of Rights. Some sex
offenders may continue to be treated as a sui generis cate-
gory, even under the new MPC: Sentencing provisions.
Section 7.06, which delineates certificates of restoration of
rights, for example, indicates that such certificates would be
available to felony offenders who have integrated
successfully and led a crime-free life. They should be
mandatory for misdemeanor and minor felony offenses
once a set period of time has passed without the individual
committing another offense, § 7.06(3)(a). For others a pre-
ponderance of evidence showing successful reintegration
should suffice, § 7.06(3)(b). These provisions, as written,
would apply to any offense of convictions.
Yet for more serious felony sex offenders, restrictions
on relief set forth in Model Penal Code Article 213 (‘‘Sexual
Assault and Related Offenses’’) could continue to apply
under § 7.06(4). The current Article 213 does not include
any collateral sanctions, which is not surprising as it was
drafted long before such sanctions became widespread in
the United States.50 The ALI is in the process of updating
the sexual assault offense provisions of the Model Penal
Code, which have become outdated in light of societal and
subsequent legal changes. The ALI membership has not
(yet) reached agreement on the revised definitions under
Article 213, though that provision currently indicates that
both forcible and aggravated forcible rape would be ‘‘reg-
istrable’’ offenses.51 The language in § 7.06 therefore seems
to defer to the newly drafted and yet-to-be finalized lan-
guage in the substantive provisions of the Model Penal
Code. Whether that deference is appropriate may remain
unanswered, though it may be indicative of the ongoing
special treatment of sex offenders and the unique chal-
lenges surrounding sex offender sentencing. Section 7.06
may still provide some hope for sex offenders as a certificate
of restoration of rights may be granted even if one or more
mandatory collateral sanctions remain in place.52
Whether such certificates will ever be sufficient to
overcome stigma and shaming for those convicted of sex
offenses remains an open question. The MPC: Sentencing
does not explicitly allow for expungements or the sealing of
convictions. Both allow a record to disappear from public
view, with the individual being permitted to deny its exis-
tence. To many that approach appears disingenuous as it
attempts to erase history and perhaps camouflage a poten-
tial public safety problem. The paucity of such instruments
at present53 and their exclusion from the MPC: Sentencing
may reflect the reality of changed preferences from a model
of forgetting to forgiving.54 Yet, it may be sex offenders
more than any other group who would benefit from their
offenses being forgotten.
Because of the special nature of sex offenses, jurisdic-
tions may want to consider referring requests for relief or
certificates to specialized judges. Sex offender petitions
may require the court to be familiar with empirical evidence
and the array of sophisticated findings on sex offender
recidivism, and with the value and challenges of sex
offender registration and notification.
V. Conclusion
Even the new MPC: Sentencing cannot escape entirely the
sui generis categorization of sex offenders. In some respects
it seems hardly designed to change legislative attitudes
toward sex offenders, who are after all individuals with
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rights, especially after their sentence has expired. Rather
than apparently accepting the restriction of offenders’
rights and freedoms based on generic, unverified, and in
some cases disproven, recidivism and risk concerns, it
should have required a showing of an ongoing individual
public safety risk before collateral sanctions, and especially
strong sanctions like registration and notification, be
imposed. Such provisions, however, would present perhaps
too dramatic a move away from today’s status quo to be
broadly acceptable.
Registries are expensive and should be used only for
those offenders who pose a distinct threat to the public.
Notification should be discarded entirely or merely retained
for a very select group of highly dangerous offenders. The
resources freed through such changes could be invested in
the treatment of sex offenders. Although frequently
underappreciated, treatment efforts are effective in
decreasing the safety risk an offender poses,55 and should
therefore be actively pursued and sufficiently funded,
inside and outside of prison. Yet, at least in the United
States, treatment appears to be more an afterthought rather
than an essential component to a public safety strategy.
Instead this country has invested in an exclusionary and
relatively ineffective public safety strategy.
Notes
* I am grateful to Andrew Christensen, Faculty Services Librar-
ian, and to Linda Newell, Public Services Assistant, both at
Washington and Lee’s Law Library, for their research assis-
tance. For comments and feedback, I can be reached at
demleitnern@wlu.edu or you can follow me on Twitter
@NDemleitner.
1 See Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), cert.
denied sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 138 S.Ct. 925 (2018)
(holding retroactive life-time registration under state’s sex
offender registration act in violation of state and federal ex
post facto provisions); People v. Temelkoski, 905 N.W.2d 593
(Mich. 2018) (holding sex offender registration law unconsti-
tutional on substantive due process grounds as applied to
Temelkoski).
2 See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love, Jenny Roberts, & Cecelia
Klingele, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction:
Law, Policy & Practice §§ 2:38–2:46 (2d ed. 2016). Even
involuntary civil commitment is a possible collateral sanction
for (select) sex offenders.
3 See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). But see Muniz,
164 A.3d 1189 (declaring sex offender registration to be
punishment).
4 The Supreme Court has been criticized for perpetuating the
myth of exceptionally high re-offense rates for sex offenders.
See Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 704 (6th Cir. 2016),
rehearing denied, cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 55 (2017); Adam
Liptak, Did the Supreme Court Base a Ruling on a Myth?, N.Y.
TImes, Mar. 6, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/
06/us/politics/supreme-court-repeat-sex-offenders.html. Yet
courts continue to cite to these alleged data points. See, e.g.,
Illinois v. Pepitone, 2018 IL 122034 (Apr. 5, 2018) (upholding
ban on child sex offender’s presence in public park on rational
basis grounds by declaring only legislature capable of asses-
sing recidivism data), http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/
Opinions/SupremeCourt/2018/122034.pdf.
5 See generally Roger Przybylski, U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring,
Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking, Recidivism of Adult
Sexual Offenders (July 2015), https://www.smart.gov/pdfs/
RecidivismofAdultSexualOffenders.pdf. See also U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission, Recidivism Among Federal Offenders:
A Comprehensive Overview, available at https://www.ussc.
gov/research/research-reports/recidivism-among-federal-
offenders-comprehensive-overview (1.9% recidivism rate for
rape for all convicted of a federal offense, at Figure 5).
6 Sex offenses have been trending downward since the mid-
1980s, well before most states adopted sex offender regis-
tries. The greatest decline occurred prior to 1994, the year in
which Megan Kanka was killed and registries became wide-
spread nationally. James Vess, Andrew Day, Martine Powell, &
Joe Graffam, International sex offender registration laws:
Research and evaluation issues, based on a review of current
scientific literature, 15(4) Police Prac. & Res. 322, 325 (2014).
7 See, e.g., Anna C. Woodrow & David A. Bright, Effectiveness of
a Sex Offender Treatment Programme: A Risk Band Analysis,
55(1) Int’l J. Offender Therapy & Comp. Criminology 43 (Feb.
2011) (analyzing impact of cognitive-behavioral treatment on
sex offender recidivism).
8 Model Penal Code: Sentencing Article 7 (ALI, Approved Final
Draft, 2017) [hereinafter MPC: Sentencing]. The collateral
consequences provisions of the MPC: Sentencing are included
in the Appendix to this Issue of the Federal Sentencing
Reporter.
9 Elizabeth A. Pearson, Status and latest developments in sex
offender registration and notification laws, in U.S. Department
of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Conference
on Sex Offender Registries: Proceedings of A BJS/SEARCH
Conference 45 (Apr. 1998, NCJ-168965), at https://www.bjs.
gov/content/pub/pdf/Ncsor.pdf; Love et al., supra note 2, at
§§ 2:38–2:46. For an in-depth discussion of the history of
criminal registration and notification laws in the United
States, see Wayne A. Logan, Knowledge As Power: Criminal
Registration and Community Notification Laws in America
(2009).
10 Kimberly Gentry Sperber, Christopher T. Lowenkamp, David
E. Carter, & Randy Allman, A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing or a Wolf
in Sheep’s Clothing? Ohio Sex Offender Registration and the Role
of Science, 21(4) Crim. Just. Pol’y Rev. 500, 501 (2010).
11 Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending,
Registering, and Tracking, SMART Summary 2016: Global
Survey of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Systems
(2016), at https://smart.gov/pdfs/global-survey-2016-final.
pdf.
12 Three of these federal laws are named after child victims of
abductions and killings. Jacob Wetterling’s body was not
recovered until 2016. Pam Lynchner was a national advocate
for registries and more severe prison terms for sex offenders.
13 For general information on these legislative developments and
links to the relevant acts, see Legislative History of Sex Offender
Registration and Notification, https://www.smart.gov/
legislation.htm.
14 Failure to substantially implement the SORNA requirements
will lead to a loss of 10 percent of Byrne grant funding.
15 The Adam Walsh Act also delineates registration requirements
for juvenile offenders. These have become increasingly dis-
puted but are beyond the purview of this article. See, e.g.,
Robin Walker Sterling, Juvenile-Sex-Offender Registration: An
Impermissible Life Sentence, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 295 (2015);
Elizabeth J. Letourneau, Dipankar Bandyopadhyay, Debajyoti
Sinha, & Kevin S. Armstrong, The influence of sex offender
registration on juvenile sexual recidivism, 20(2) Crim. Just.
Pol’y Rev. 136 (2009).
16 Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending,
Registering, and Tracking, Sex Offender Registration and Noti-
fication Act (SORNA)—State and Territory Implementation
FEDERAL SENTENC ING REPORTER • VOL . 30 , NOS . 4 -5 • APR IL/ JUNE 2018 323
Progress Check (Dec. 19, 2017), at https://www.smart.gov/
pdfs/SORNA-progress-check.pdf.
17 See, e.g., Restoration of Rights Project, 50-State Comparison
Relief from Sex Offender Registration Obligations (updated Nov.
1, 2017), at http://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-
profiles/50-state-comparison-relief-from-sex-offender-
registration-obligations/; Wayne A. Logan, Database Infamia:
Exit from the Sex Offender Registries, 2015 Wisc. L. Rev. 219
(2015).
18 MPC: Sentencing, Art. 7.02(1).
19 Lisa Murphy, J. Paul Fedoroff, & Melissa Martineau, Canada’s
Sex Offender Registries: Background, Implementation, and
Social Policy Considerations, 18 Can. J. Hum. Sexuality 61,
65–66 (2009).
20 Elizabeth J. Letourneau, Jill S. Levenson, Dipankar Bandyo-
padhyay, Debajyoti Sinha, & Kevin S. Armstrong, U.S.
Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Evaluating
the Effectiveness of Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Policies for Reducing Sexual Violence Against Women 28 (Sept.
2010) (study limited to South Carolina), at https://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/231989.pdf.
21 Sperber et al., supra note 10, at 514.
22 See, e.g., Sperber et al., supra note 10 (evaluating Ohio’s reg-
istry and finding a mismatch between registration category
and risk assessment).
23 See, e.g., Letourneau et al., supra note 20, at 52–53.
24 See, e.g., id. at 54–55.
25 Vess et al., supra note 6, at 326; Letourneau et al., supra note
20, at 46–47.
26 Murphy et al., supra note 19, at 68.
27 Letourneau et al., supra note 20.
28 See infra text at note 21.
29 See, e.g., Sam Levin, Stanford sexual assault: Read the full text




30 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). But see State v.
Trotter, 330 P.3d 1267, 1271 (Utah 2014) (‘‘[T]he statutory
restrictions imposed on sex offenders—and the resulting
social consequences—are not akin to the restrictions and
consequences faced by deportees.’’).
31 See, e.g., Privette v. State, 2012 WL 6172037, at *9 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 2012) (failure to advise the defendant of sex
offender registration did not render the plea constitutionally
invalid because ‘‘the registration requirements . . . are nonpu-
nitive and . . . are therefore a collateral consequence of a guilty
plea.’’); Love et al., supra note 2, at § 4:7 (discussing Sixth
Amendment issues pertaining to collateral sanctions).
32 MPC: Sentencing, § 7.04.
33 The existing concerns about sex offender registries and public
notification should counsel against duplicating such laws for
other types of offenders. But see Karin Brulliard, Animal abu-
sers are being registered like sex offenders in these jurisdictions,




34 Letourneau et al., note 20, at 53.
35 See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (federal sex
offender registration not sufficiently retributive to render it
punitive rather than regulatory); Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety
and Corr. Servs., 430 Md. 535, 600, 62 A.3d 123 (Md. Ct.
app. 2013) (‘‘sex offender registration is not punishment, but
a collateral consequence of a conviction’’).
36 Sandy Jung, Meredith Allison, & Erin Martin, Perspectives of
Americans and Canadians on the use and function of sex offender
registries, 52 Int’l J. L., Crime & Just. 106 (2018).
37 A panoply of statutes excludes sex offenders from a broad
swath of employment. Some of these restrictions are closely
related to the convicted offense, others are much broader.
There are also limitations on access to public housing and on
the location of any housing, which has to be away from
schools, daycare centers, and churches.
38 See, e.g., J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Laws Affect Criminal Behavior?,
54(1) J.L. & Econ. 161 (2011); Richard Tewksbury, Wesley G.
Jennings, & Kristen Zgoba, National Institute of Justice, Final
Report on Sex Offenders: Recidivism and Collateral Conse-
quences (Sept. 30, 2011), at https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/238060.pdf.
39 Letourneau et al., supra note 20, at 53–54.
40 Cf. Restoration of Rights Project, supra note 17.
41 Virginia already uses risk assessment to divert select offen-
ders from imprisonment. Its sex offender risk assessment
instrument identifies high-risk individuals for whom longer
sentences may be appropriate. See Virginia General Instruc-
tions 42–46, 47–51. Pennsylvania is currently considering the
integration of risk assessment directly into sentencing. Its
purpose would be to provide not for more severe sentences
but rather for more individually appropriate sanctions. Penn-
sylvania Commission on Sentencing, Proposed Sentence Risk





42 Illinois Sex Offenses and Sex Offender Registration Task
Force, Research Report: Sex Offenses & Sex Offender Registra-




44 See Restoration of Rights Project, supra note 17.
45 MPC: Sentencing § 7.02, comment (f).
46 Id. at Reporters’ Note (f) (referencing Ala. Code 1975 § 15-
20A-23 (2011)).
47 Id. (‘‘The commission’s guidance to courts considering
motions for relief may also take into account a particular
defendant’s circumstances that bear on public safety risk,
such as other criminal history, age at the time of the offense,
time elapsed since the offense, participation in treatment for
mental-health or substance-abuse problems, and evidence of
rehabilitation.’’)
48 MPC: Sentencing § 7.04(2)(c).
49 MPC: Sentencing § 7.05(3).
50 American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentar-
ies, Art. 213 Sexual Offenses (text of Model Penal Code as
adopted at the 1962 Annual Meeting of the American Law
Institute at Washington, D.C., May 24, 1962) (1980).
51 American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Sexual Assault and
Related Offenses, Tentative Draft No. 3 (Apr. 6, 2017), sub-
mitted but not approved by the ALI membership in May 2017.
None of the drafts presented to or discussed by the mem-
bership at ALI Annual Meetings to date have included provi-
sions on collateral sanctions.
52 MPC: Sentencing § 7.06(4).
53 Several federal circuits, for example, have indicated that they
lack the authority to expunge individual criminal records
except for extremely rare and extraordinary circumstances or
upon Congressional legislation. The others have ruled that
they have such equitable power, yet they rarely exercise it. See
cases cited in United States v. Doe, 110 F. Supp.3d 448, 455 n.
16 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), ordered vacated, 833 F.3d 192 (2d Cir.
2016), reprinted in this Issue at pp. 294–299. See also Nora V.
Demleitner, Judicial Challenges to the Collateral Impact of
324 FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER • VOL . 30 , NOS . 4 -5 • APR I L/JUNE 2018
Criminal Convictions—Is True Change in the Offing?, 91 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. Online 150 (Nov. 2016), http://www.nyulawreview.
org/online-features/judicial-challenges-collateral-impact-
criminal-convictions-true-change-offing. One state has autho-
rized its courts to seal records held by state officials of federal
and out-of-state convictions to prevent consequences under
state laws. See Ohio Code § 2953.32(A)(1); Michael C. Hen-
nenberg, Justin Withrow, & William Summers, With No Signs of
Federal Legislation to Expunge Federal Convictions, State Courts
May Provide a Mechanism to Minimize Collateral Consequences,
in The State of Criminal Justice 2017 279, 285–86 (Mark
Wojzek ed., American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Sec-
tion, June 2017). That model is unique and limited, though
other states may want to consider it to restrict state collateral
consequences falling upon individuals for whom the state did
not intend them.
54 In the United States prior information about an individual is
forever retained online. Contrast this, however, with the
privacy-based approach preferred in the European Union and
the Council of Europe. See, e.g., Alessandro Corda, Beyond
Totem and Taboo: Toward a Narrowing of American Criminal
Record Exceptionalism, 30 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 241, 245 (2018);
Alexander Novotny, Being Forgotten on the Internet: How
Temporal Contextual Integrity Can Protect Online Reputation
(2016); Muge Fazlioglu, Forget me not: The clash of the right to
be forgotten and freedom of expression on the Internet, 3(3) Int’l
Data Privacy L. 149 (Aug. 1, 2013).
55 See, e.g., Roger Przybylski, U.S. Department of Justice, Office
of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Reg-
istering, and Tracking, The Effectiveness of Treatment of Adult
Sexual Offenders (July 2015), https://www.smart.gov/pdfs/
TheEffectivenessofTreatmentforAdultSexualOffenders.pdf.
FEDERAL SENTENC ING REPORTER • VOL . 30 , NOS . 4 -5 • APR IL/ JUNE 2018 325
